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CHAPTER 16 
State and Local Taxation 
JAMES A. ALOISI, JR. * 
ROBERT CARLEO** 
THOMAS HAMMOND*** 
MICHAEL PORTER**** 
§ 16.1. Personal Income Taxes -·Graduated Exemptions. The Supreme 
Judicial Court has consistently held that article 44 of the Massachusetts 
Constitutionl forbids the taxation of income from the same class of 
property at graduated rates. 2 During the Survey year, however, the Court 
retreated somewhat from its previously uniform stand against legislative 
imposition of graduated income taxation. In an advisory opinion respond-
ing to a question posed by the Taxation Committee of the House of 
Representatives,3 the Court indicated that a bill proposing a system of 
* JAMES A. ALOISI, JR. is chief of the Legal Bureau at the Massachusetts Department 
of Revenue. 
** ROBERT CARL~O is a Tax Counsel at the Department of Revenue. 
*** THOMAS HAMMOND is a Tax Counsel at the Department of Revenue. 
**** MICHAEL PORTER is a Tax Counsel at the Department of Revenue. 
§ 16.1. I MASS. CONST. amend. art. 44 provides: 
ART. XLIV. Full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the general 
court to impose and levy a tax on income in the manner hereinafter provided. Such 
tax may be at different rates upon income derived from different classes of property, 
but shall be levied at a uniform rate throughout the commonwealth upon incomes 
derived from the same class of property. The general court may tax income not 
derived from property at a lower rate than income derived from property, and may 
grant reasonable exemptions and abatements. Any class of property the income from 
which is taxed under the provisions of this article may be exempted from the 
imposition and levying of proportional and reasonab~e assessments, rates and taxes as 
at present authorized by the constitution. This article shall not be construed to limit 
the power of the general court to impose and levy reasonable duties and excises. 
2 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1433, 1434, 423 N.E.2d 751, 752 (holding proposed state income tax based on flat rate 
percentage of taxpayer's federal income tax violative of uniforming requirements under 
article 44); Opinion ofthe Justices, 266 Mass. 583,585, 165 N.E. 900, 901-02 (1929) (holding 
proposed state income tax "graded as to rate according to the amount of income received by 
the taxpayer" constitutionally infirm, because such a tax would not be proportional as 
required under article 44). 
3 Opinion ofthe Justices, 386 Mass. 1223,437 N.E.2d 194 (1982). The question posed to 
the Court was phrased as follows: 
1
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graduated exemptions from state income tax would be constitutional 
under article 44. 
The proposed legislation, House Bill No. 5528, sets forth a schedule of 
so-called "vanishing" exemptions from state income tax. 4 Under present 
law, single individuals with income not exceeding $3,000 and married 
individuals with income not exceeding $5,000 in the aggregate are entitled 
to a complete exemption from Massachusetts income tax. s In contrast to 
the current total exemption with a ceiling, the bill submitted to the Court 
proposed a new schedule of exemptions which progressively decrease as 
the total income of the individual increases. 6 For instance, individuals 
with income not exceeding $3,000 would continue to be entitled to total 
exemption, as under current law. 7 Individuals with income exceeding 
$3,000, however, would also be eligible for an exemption; the amount of 
their exemption would decrease by $300 from the original $3,000 exemp-
tion for each incremental increase of $3,000 in income. 8 Consequently, 
Is it constitutionally competent for the General Court to enact House Bill No. 5528 
which would provide for a system of low income vanishing exemptions from the state 
income tax under the provisions of Article XLIV of the Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts? 
[d. at 1223,437 N.E.2d at 195. 
Four of the seven Justices considering the bill found the exemption scheme proposed 
therein to be consistent with the uniformity requirements of article 44. [d. at 1223-30, 
437 N .E.2d at 194-98. The remaining three justices would have answered the question 
propounded by the House in the negative; that is, they viewed the majority opinion as 
a misconstruction of prior precedent regarding the scope of the "reasonable exemp-
tion" exception in article 44, and thus thought the proposed bill an impermissible, de 
facto, graduated income tax. [d. at 1230-34,437 N.E.2d at 198-200. 
4 [d. at 1224,437 N.E.2d at 195. House Bill No. 5528 would amend G.L. c. 62, § 5(a), as 
appearing in Acts of 1973, c. 723, § 2, by substituting a new section 5(a). See infra notes 5-9 
and accompanying text for discussion and relevant text of the current and proposed section 
5(a). 
S G.L. c. 62, § 5(a), amended by Acts of 1973, c. 723, § 2, provides in relevant part: 
Taxable income shall be exempt from all taxes imposed by this chapter if the total 
income of the taxable year does not exceed three thousand dollars for a single 
individual or five thousand dollars in the aggregate for a husband and wife. No tax 
shall be imposed under this chapter which shall reduce such taxable income below 
three thousand dollars and five thousand dollars respectively. 
6 386 Mass. at 1224, 437 N .E.2d at 195. 
7 [d. at 1225, 437 N.E.2d at 195 (proposed schedule of exemptions for individual tax-
payers reproduced in text of the Court's opinion). Married taxpayers filing jointly would 
continue to be entitled to total exemption, as under current law, so long. as their total joint 
income does not exceed $5,000. [d. at 1225 n.2, 437 N.E.2d at 195 n.2. 
8 [d. at 1225, 437 N.E.2d at 195 (proposed schedule of exemptions for individual tax-
payers reproduced in text of the Court's opinion). For married taxpayers filing jointly, the 
proposed reduction is $500 from the original $5,000 exemption for eVery incremental in-
crease of $5,000 in joint income. The exemption phases out at $50,000 ofjoint income. The 
House bill also provides a schedule of exemptions for married taxpayers filing separately, 
2
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the entitlement to an exemption under the proposed bill would completely 
phase out, or "vanish," when an individual's income for the taxable year 
exceeds $30,000. 9 
In sanctioning this scheme, the Supreme Judicial Court emphasized 
that article 44 authorizes the General Court to" 'grant reasonable exemp-
tions and abatements.' "10 The Court reasoned that, because of the au-
thorization for exemptions, "the constitutional requirement of a uniform 
rate of taxation cannot be absolute." II Relying primarily on an earlier 
opinion of the Court, sanctioning the legislature's broad discretion in 
granting reasonable exemptions,12 the Court concluded that the exemp-
tion scheme proposed in the House Bill No. 5528 satisfied the "rea-
sonableness" requirement,13 The Court viewed the amounts of the vary-
ing income class exemptions as not sufficiently large to produce unequal 
treatment oftaxpayers. 14 1t tested the proposed scheme against one which 
it had previously approved in the 1930s,15 making appropriate adjust-
calling for a maximum exemption of $2,500 which, after gradual reduction with increased 
income, phases out when total income is greater than $25,000.ld. at 1225 n.2, 437 N.E.2d at 
195 n.2. 
9 ld. at 1229 n.5, 437 N.E.2d at 198 n.5. See supra note 8 for discussion of separate 
schedules for married taxpayers filing jointly and married taxpayers filing separately. 
10 ld. at 1226, 437 N.E.2d at 196. See supra note l. 
11 ld. at 1226, 437 N.E.2d at 196. 
12 Opinion ofthe Justices, 270 Mass. 593, 599-600, 170 N .E. 800, 804 (1930) (with regard 
to the provision for "reasonable exemptions" in article 44 the Court stated: "Those words 
were designed to vest a considerable discretion in the General Court in determining how 
[income taxes] ought to be apportioned among all the people to the end that the burdens for 
the support of government may rest as nearly equally as possible among those able to bear 
them. "), cited in Opinions ofthe Justices, 386 Mass. 1223,1226,437 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1982); 
see Daley v. State Tax Comm'n, 376 Mass. 861,865-66,383 N .E.2d 1140, 1143 (1978) (Court 
stating that with respect to exemptions, "[t]he Legislature surely has a considerable range of 
discretion within the bounds of reason."), cited in Opinion of the Justices, 386 Mass. 1223, 
1226, 437 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1982). 
t3 386 Mass. at 1227-28, 437 N.E.2d at 197. 
14 ld. at 1229, 437 N .E.2d at 197. 
IS See Opinion of the Justices, 270 Mass. 593,170 N.E. 800 (1930), cited in Opinion of the 
Justices, 386 Mass. 1223, 1226,437 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1982). The 1930 decision rendered by 
the Justices of the Court was likewise in response to a question concerning the constitution-
ality, under article 44, of a bill proposing a personal income tax exemption scheme. The 
Justices indicated their approval of the bill, proposing exemptions of $1,500 to single 
persons, $3,000 to married persons, and an additional exemption of $250 for each dependent 
other than a husband or wife. 270 Mass. at 597-98, 170 N .E. at 803. The proposed bill further 
provided that the available exemption would be reduced, dollar for dollar, by the amount of 
the taxpayer's income exceeding $10,000.270 Mass. at 596, 170 N.E. at 802. The Justices' 
approval of the bill, including the reduction scheme, was interpreted by the 1982 Court as 
acceptance of the constitutionality of a graduated exemption scheme. 386 Mass. at 1227,437 
N .E.2d at 196-97. 
3
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ments reflecting "changes between 1930 and now in the purchasing power 
of the dollar and increases in per capita income. "16 In addition, the Court 
considered the exemption scheme reasonable as a measure for relieving 
those individuals least able to pay taxes.J7 
The Court voiced one reservation to its approval of the graduated 
exemption bill; namely, that the bill might be unconstitutional as applied 
to taxpayers in the lowest ranges of the various brackets .18 While foresee-
ing the problem of lack of uniform treatment of borderline taxpayers, the 
Court intimated no solutions or "corrections" which it would consider 
constitutionally appropriate. 19 
While the Court's opinion may be viewed by some as a great divergence 
from past decisions concerning a graduated system of taxation, it must be 
evaluated in light of the total amounts of the proposed exemptions. The 
range of the exemptions authorized in House Bill No. 5528 clearly falls 
within the range of what has been construed as reasonable in the past. 20 
The largest effective increase per taxpayer as a result of bracket jumping 
is at the lower end of each exemption bracket. The Court, however, in 
approving this proposal, considered this a modest increase when viewed 
in the context of total increases in purchasing power and per capita 
income since the Court's opinion of over fifty years ago' defining what 
constitutes a reasoIlable system of exemptions. 21 In summary, the mod-
Those Justices of the 1982 Court who declined to join in the majority opinion took issue 
with the majority's reading of the 1930 opinion as implying general approval of a graduated 
exemption scheme based on a taxpayer's income. The dissenting Justices of the 1982 Court 
considered the 1930 decision to be limited to approval of a bill narrowly tailored to relieve a 
certain class of taxpayers from state taxes "solely on the basis of lack of ability to pay tax." 
386 Mass. at 1232-33,437 N.E.2d at 199-200 (emphasis in original). 
16 386 Mass. at 1228 & n.4, 1229, 437 N.E.2d at 197 & n.4, 198. 
17 Id. at 1228-29,437 N.E.2d at 197-98. The dissenting Justices considered the majority 
opinion incorrect insofar as it read into the bill a purpose to provide relief to low income 
taxpayers when no such purpose was expressed in the bill itself. /d. at 1232-33,437 N .E.2d 
at 199-200. 
18 /d. at 1229, 437 N .E.2d at 198. With respect to the uniformity problem posed by the 
House bill, the Court stated: 
[T]here appears to be a significant Question about the constitutionality of the pro-
posed bill as it applies to taxpayers whose total income falls in the lowest ranges of 
the various brackets. For example, by earning one more dollar of income a taxpayer 
may move into the next higher bracket and thus be granted a lower exemption. The 
additional income tax resulting from earning that additional dollar would substantially 
exceed one dollar. Some appropriate correction might be considered in order to avoid 
situations of this character, which present a special problem of lack of uniformity. 
/d. at 1229-30, 437 N .E.2d at 198. 
19/d. at 1229-30,437 N.E.2d at 198. 
20 Compare the exemption scheme approved in Opinion of the Justices, 270 Mass. 593, 
594-97, 170 N.E. 800, 802-03 (1930), discussed supra at note 15. 
21 386. Mass. at 1227-28.437 N.E.2d at 197 (citing Opinion ofthe Justices, 270 Mass. 593, 
600-01, 170 N.E. 800, 805 (930». 
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ification which would be achieved by this proposed legislation is not 
significant enough to be consid~red a back door effort at introducing a 
graduated income tax in the Commonwealth. 
§ 16.2. Real Estate Taxation - Foreclosure - Low Value Land Sales-
Notice Requirement. There are two procedures under Massachusetts law 
for sale of land as a consequence of nonpayment of taxes, one for the sale 
of land of low value l and the other more formal procedure of judicial 
foreclosure. 2 In contrElst to the judicial foreclosure procedure, sales of 
low value land under chapter 60, section 79 of the General Laws may be 
made without judicial supervision. Section 79 is designed to provide a 
"more economical and more expeditious" means of collectiQg taxes on 
land of low value. 3 
The validity of the statute governing tax sales of low value land was 
addressed by the Supreme Judicial Court during the Survey year in 
Guaranty Mortgage Corp. v. Burlington.4 In keeping with the design of 
section 79 as a "more economical and more expeditious" procedure for a 
tax sale,S the Court in Guaranty Mortgage held that a mortgagee of land 
which the tax collector intends to sell pursuant to section 79 is neither 
entitled to actual notice of the low value determination6 nor actual notice 
of the proposed sale under the statute. 7 More importantly, the Court held 
that the notice provisions of the low value land sale statute satisfy the 
requirements of due process under both the fourteenth amendment of the 
United States Constitution and article ten of the Massachusetts Declara-
tion of Rights. 8 
The plaintiff, Guaranty Mortgage Corporation, held a first mortgage on 
certain parcels of land in the town of Burlington. 9 The entities ownin~ 
§ 16.2. 1 G.L. c. 60, § 79. "Low value" land is 4efined under the statute as land which, 
in the opinion of the Commissioner of Revenue, is "of insufficient value to meet the taxes, 
interest anQ charges including the payment of fifty dQllars ... as the legal fee for proceedings 
under this section ... " assessed on the land, as well as any parcel the value of which is not 
considered to exceed "two thousand five hundred dollars." 
2 G.L. c. 60, §§ 16, 40, 42, 43, 52, 65. 
3 Johnson v. McMahon, 344 Mass. 348, 353-54, 182 N.E.2d 507, 511 (1962). 
4 385 Mass. 411,432 N.E.2d 480 (1982). 
5 See supra note 3 !lnd accompanying text. 
6 385 Mass. at 415-16, 432 N.E.2d at 484. 
7 [d. at 416-17, 432 N.E.2d at 484-85. 
8 [d. at 420, 432 N.E.2d at 486. 
9 [d. at 413, 432 N .E.2d at 483. The mortgages were given to Guaranty by Hart Properties, 
Inc., owning one grouping of the parcels, and by McLaughlin Realty Trust, owning the 
remaining parcels I\t issue. The mortgages on these properties had been assigned by 
Guaranty to State Street Bank and Trust Co. The assignments were not recorded, however, 
prior to the tax sale of the properties. Consequently, Guaranty, as mortgagee of recQrd prior 
to the tax sale, was a necessary party to the maintenance of the suit against the town of 
Burlington. [d. 
5
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these parcels had failed, after several written demands by the town tax 
collector, to pay taxes on the properties for three successive years. lO 
Consequently, the tax collector, following the publication of notice, took 
the properties to satisfy the tax claim. I I The Commissioner of Revenue 
(the "Commissioner") subsequently made and recorded an affidavit pur-
suant to chapter 60, section 79 stating that the land fell within the defini-
tion of low value land under the statute. 12 The town of Burlington sent 
written notice of the proposed sale of the properties to the owners of 
record of the lots and, in addition, notice was published in a local news-
paper and posted in a public place in Burlington. 13 The treasurer of the 
town did not, however, send written notice of the Commissioner's low 
value determination, or of the proposed sale ofthe parcels, to Guaranty. 14 
After a public auction in which the properties were sold, Guaranty made 
an otTer to redeem the lots. IS The treasurer of Burlington refused the 
otTer, prompting Guaranty to bring suit challenging the l~gality of the 
sales. 16 
Guaranty's suit rested on principally three arguments l7 referable to the 
notice requirements under chapter 60, section 79: first, Guaranty con-
10 [d. at 414, 432 N.E.2d at 483. 
II [d. The Court stated that the notice of intention to take the lots was "posted in two or 
more convenient and public places in Burlington." [d.; see G.L. c. 60, § S3 (requiring that 
notice be posted "in two or more convenient and public places" fourteen days prior to the 
taking). In addition, the takings were recorded. 
12 385 Mass. at 415, 432 N.E.2d at 483-84. 
13 [d. at 412-13, 432 N.E.2d at 482-83. The notice, both published and sent to the owners 
of record, read as follows: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT on January 14, 1974, at 9:30 A.M., at Town Trea-
surer's Office, pursuant to the provisions of General Laws, Chapter 60, Sections 79 to 
SOB, inclusive, and by virtue of the recording on November 26, 1973, of an affidavit of 
a finding by the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, with Middlesex South 
District Registry of Deeds, as Instrument No. 221, I SHALL OFFER FOR SALE AT 
PUBLIC AUCTION, severally or together, certain parcels of land oflow value listed in 
said affidavit, said parcels having been taken or purchased by the Town of Burlington 
for nonpayment of the taxes due thereon. 
[d. at 413 n.4, 432 N.E.2d at 482-83 n.4; see G.L. c. 60, § 79 (requiring that notice of time and 
place of the sale be published at least 14 days prior to the sale in a town newspaper or, if 
there is no town newspaper, the notice must be posted in a convenient public place). 
14 385 Mass. at 415, 432 N.E.2d at 484. 
U [d. Guaranty tendered a check for $12, 426.39, to the treasurer of Burlington for the 
purpose of redeeming the lots. 
16 [d. 
17 In addition to the three principal arguments discussed in the text, Guaranty argued that 
the published notice respecting the land sales did not contain an adequate d~scription of the 
land. [d. at 418, 432 N.E.2d at 485. Because the Court summarily rejected this argument by 
reference to the required description under section 79, and, further, because!this argument is 
incidental to Guaranty's general claim of a right to personal notice, this argument is not 
treated in the text of this section. 
6
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tended that it was entitled to actual notice of the low value determina-
tion; 18 second, Guaranty contended that it was entitled to prior actual 
notice of the Public Sale of the lots;19 finally, Guaranty urged that the 
limited notice obligations under G.L. c. 60, § 79 violated the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 20 
With respect to Guaranty's first claim, concerning notice of the low value 
determination, the Court held that the words of the low value sale statute 
did not provide Guaranty the right to personal notice of the Commis-
sioner's affidavit. 21 The Court construed the statute as follows: 
The Legislature imposed only three conditions for the effective termination 
of the right to redeem under the low-value procedure: "(1) the issuance of 
the affidavit by the Commissioner, (2) the proper recording of the affidavit, 
and (3) the posting of fourteen days' notice of the intended sale. "22 
Noting that these conditions had been met, the Court rejected Guaranty's 
demand for personal notice. 23 The Court concluded that "to impose the 
burden of [personal] notice would destroy the purpose of the low-value 
procedure," reasoning that the statute was aimed at providing an ex-
peditious alternative to judicial foreclosure. 24 
Responding to Guaranty's second claim of entitlement to notice of the 
proposed land sales, the Court again stressed that no such entitlement to 
personal notice could be found in the language of section 79. 25 Guaranty 
pointed out, however, that instructions in a state tax form, prescribed by 
the Commissioner, 26 provided that notice be sent by registered mail to 
any person having a right of redemption or any other interest in the land.27 
The Court deemed the town's noncompliance with this directive immate-
rial to the issue of whether a legal duty to give notice was violated. 28 The 
Commissioner's directive did not have the effect oflaw and could not bind 
the township, according to the Court. 29 
18 [d. at 415,432 N.E.2d at 484. 
19 [d. at 416, 432 N.E.2d at 484. 
20 [d. at 418, 432 N.E.2d at 485-86. 
21 [d. at 415, 432 N.E.2d at 484. 
22 [d. at 415-16, 432 N.E.2d at 484. 
23 [d. at 416, 432 N.E.2d at 484. 
24 [d. at 415, 432 N.E.2d at 484. 
25 [d. at 416, 432 N.E.2d at 484. 
26 See Form 470A (notice of sale of low value land) prescribed by the Commissioner 
pursuant to G.L. c. 60, § 105 which provides: "Forms to be used in proceedings for the 
collection of taxes under this chapter and chapter fifty-nine and of all assessments which the 
collector is authorized or required by law to collect shall be as prescribed or approved by the 
commissioner. " 
27 385 Mass. at 416, 432 N.E.2d at 484. 
28 [d. at 416-17, 432 N.E.2d at 484-85. 
29 [d. The Court stated that section 79 had fully regulated the subject of notice obligations 
attendant on low-value land sales and, consequently, the Commissioner "cannot further 
regulate it by the adoption of a regulation which is repugnant to the statute." [d. at 417,432 
7
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In connection with Guaranty's claim to right of notice as to the land 
sales, the Supreme Judicial Court also noted that, even if it were to take 
an equitable view of Guaranty's position, its conclusion would be no 
different. 30 The Court mentioned several measures available to Guaranty 
that would have created a right to notice, but which Guaranty failed to 
undertake.3! Specifically, the Court stated that Guaranty could have 
taken advantage of the statutory option to be notified of the demand for 
payment of taxes on the land provided in chapter 60, sections 38, 39. 32 In 
addition, Guaranty ((ould have protected its interest in the land by requir-
ing a tax escrow clause in its mortgage, according to the (Court. 33 Taking 
into account Guaranty's failure to pursue these mea!jures, the Court 
emphasized that it would be inequitable to now disturb the title vested in 
the good faith purchasers of the 10ts.34 
Guaranty's final argument challenged the constitutional adequacy of the 
notice prpvisions under chapter 60, section 79, as construed by the 
Court.3S Guaranty relied principally upon the Supreme COQrt's decision in 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust CO.36 in alleging that notice of 
the sales, by publication only, violated the fourteenth amendment's re-
quirement of due proce!ls.37 In Mullane, the Supreme Court held that 
notice of a final judicial settlement of trust accounts by publication rather 
tpan by mail violated due process as to those beneficiaries whose addres-
ses were known. 3s The Guaranty Mortgage Court considered Mullane 
distinguishable from the instant case on three grounds: first, Mullane 
involved a judicially administrated procedure more like judicial foreclo-
sure than the low-value land sales procedure;39 second, in Mullane, the 
N.E.2d at 485 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 304 Mass. 452, 
457, 24 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1939». 
30 385 Mass. at 417, 432 N.E.2d at 485. 
31 [d. 
32 [d. at 414, 417, 432 N.E. 2d at 483, 485. Under O.L. c. 60, § 38, a mortgagee may give 
written notice of its mortgage to the tax Commissioner, prior to July of the year Qf the 
assessment, and thereby obligate the Commissioner to make any demand for payment of 
taxes on the mortgagee instead of the mortgagor. 
Similarly, O.L. c. 60, § 39 provides that if notice designating an address wher~ papers with 
respect to mortgaged land are to be served is filed in the office of the town clerk and sent to 
the town tax collector py the mortgagee, the collector shall be obligated to serve any demand 
for taxes at such address and, further, is fQrbidden to advertise any sale of such land for two 
months after the demand has been made. 
33 385 Mass. at 417, 432 N.E.2d at 485. 
34 [d. 
35 [d. at 418-19, 432 N.E.2d at 485-86. 
36 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
37 385 Mass. at 418-19,432 N.E.2d ilt 486. 
38 339 U.S. at 319-20. 
39 385 Mass. at 419, 432 N.E.2d at 486. 
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beneficiaries had no reason to know that their property interests were 
being affected, while evety taxpayer should be on notice that if taxes on 
property are not paid, the city or town will eventually seize and sell the 
property;40 and third, Mullane recognized the need for dispensation from 
notice by mail when it would impose "impossible or impractical obsta-
cles,"41 such as the obstacle presented in this case, according to the 
Court, of an onerous title search which would be necessitated if notice by 
mail were required under section 79.42 In view of these distinguishing 
factors, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that "nothing in Mullane 
... signals a constitutional deficiency in our statute. "43 
The Guaranty Mortgage Court thus took the view that, because the 
mortgagee claiming rights to personal notice in connection with a low-
value tax sale had failed to avail itself of statutory44 and contractual 
protections,4s no rights to personal notice would be read into chapter 60, 
section 79 which were not present in the language of the statute. Further, 
given the expeditious, nonjudicial procedure for low-value land sales 
which the legislature intended to make available under section 79, the 
Court considered the statutory pUblication notice requirements consistent 
with due process. The Court emphasized throughout its analysis that 
section 79, by its terms, provides that any sale made pursuant to the 
statute "shall be absolute upon the recording of such deed of the trea-
surer. "46 In view of this legislative mandate, the Court intimated that it 
was without authority to rescind the sale in the case before it on the basis 
of an implied condition of notice not being satisfied.47 
§ 16.3. Income Taxation - Loss Deduction. In Green v. Commissioner 
of Revenue,l decided during the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Coun 
held that a taxpayer, in computing his personal tax liability, could offset a 
bad debt loss incurred in one business against a capital gain realized from 
a completely unrelated business.2 The significance of the Green decision 
lies in its further illumination of the interrelationship between "Part A" 
and "Part B" income/loss items under the general income tax computa-
tion provision, chapter 62, section 2 of the General Laws. 3 
40/d. 
41 [d. at 419-20, 432 N.E.2d at 486 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950». 
42 [d. at 419, 432 N.E.2d at 486. 
43 [d. 
44 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
45 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
46 385 Mass. 416, 417, 432 N.E.2d at 484, 485 (quoting G.L. c. 60, § 79). 
47 [d. at 417, 432 N.E.2d at 485. 
§ 16.3. 1 386 Mass. 351, 436 N.E.2d 134 (1982). 
2 [d. at 353, 436 N.E.2d at 135. 
3 G.L. c. 62, § 2(b), divides gross income into two categories: "Part A" income includes 
9
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The taxpayer in Green was in the business of owning and operating 
commercial real estate. 4 The taxpayer was also the sole shareholder in an 
unrelated mail order business. s In 1975, the taxpayer's mail order busi-
ness became insolvent and he was required to pay a debt of the corpora-
tion pursuant to his personal guaranty. 6 In the course of his commercial 
real estate business, the taxpayer sold a parcel of realty it11975 yielding a 
substantial capital gain. 7 In his 1975 state income tax return, the taxpayer 
deducted the guaranty payment as a business bad debt loss from his Part 
B income. 8 To the extent that this loss exceeded his Part B income, the 
taxpayer offset the excess against his Part A income,9 comprised entirely 
of the capital gain realized from his real estate business. 1o 
The Commissioner of Revenue (the" Commissioner") initially took the 
position that the bad debt guaranty payment, while deductible from Part B 
income, could not be used to offset the Part A capital gain income. 11 The 
Commissioner appeared to have concluded that the capi~al gain income 
realized from the real estate transaction was not "effectjvely connected 
with the active conduct of a trade or business of the taiXpayer." 12 The 
taxpayer's application for an abatement ofthe additional tax imposed was 
thus denied. 13 
The taxpayer petitioned the Appellate Tax Board (the "Board") for 
review ofthe Commissioner's decisionY Before the Board, the Commis-
sioner changed her initial position and argued that the guaranty payment 
was neither deductible from Part B income nor from Part A income. IS The 
most dividends, interest and net capital gains; "Part B" income includes all other gross 
income. Part A income is taxed at a rate of 10% while Part B income is taxed at a rate of5%. 
G.L. c. 62, § 4. Specified deductions are permitted from each type of inc;:ome. G.L. c. 62, § 
2(c) and (d). Items deductible from Part B income, to the extent they exoeed Part B income, 
may be deducted from Part A income that is effectively connected with the taxpayer's trade 
or business. G.L. c. 62, § 2(c)(1). 
4 386 Mass. at 351, 436 N.E.2d at 134. 
sId. 
6Id. 
7 Id. at 351-52, 436 N.E.2d at 134. 
8 Id. at 352, 436 N.E.2d at 134. G.L. c. 62, § 2(d) provides that deductions permitted 
under section 62 of the federal Internal Revenue Code may be deducted from Part B income. 
Business bad debt losses are deductible under section 166(a) of the Code and thus reduce 
federal gross income under section 62(1) as a trade or business deduction. 
9 386 Mass. at 352, 436 N.E.2d at 134. G.L. c. 62, § 2(c)(1) provides that excess 
deductions from Part B income may be deducted from Part A income that is "effectively 
connected with the active conduct of a trade or business of the taxpayer." 
10 See 386 Mass. at 352-53, 436 N.E.2d at 135. 
II 386 Mass. at 352, 436 N.E.2d at 134. 
12 Id. at 352, 436 N.E.2d at 134-35. 
13 Id. at 352, 436 N.E.2d at 134. 
14Id. 
IS Id. at 352-53, 436 N.E.2d at 135. 
10
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Commissioner reasoned that the guaranty payment was a non-business 
capita1loss which could only be deducted to the extent of capital gain. 16 
The Commissioner further concluded that the taxpayer had no capital gain 
for 1975 against which he could offset the capital 10SS.17 The Board, 
without a written opinion, affirmed the Commissioner's prior determina-
tion. 18 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Green reversed the Board. 19 The Court, 
at the outset, accepted the Commissioner's characterization of the 
guaranty payment as a non-business bad debt 10ss.20 Noting that for most 
purposes the deductions allowable from Part B income are those allowed 
under section 62 of the federal Internal Revenue Code,21 the Court 
adopted the Commissioner's later position that the bad debt loss was a 
short term capital loss under the code,22 deductible23 only to the extent of 
capital gains.24 The Commissioner's view that the taxpayer had no offset-
ting capital gains, however, was rejected by the Court.2S The taxpayer, 
according to the Court, realized a capital gain in excess of the bad debt 
loss from the sale of business realty. 26 The Court noted that the Commis-
sioner had admitted before the Board that the realty had been held as part 
of the taxpayer's business and that the amount realized from its sale 
constituted a capital gain. 27 The Court therefore concluded that the tax-
payer not only permissibly deducted the loss from his Part B income, but 
was entitled to offset the excess deduction against his business-connected 
Part A income. 28 
The Court intimated in a brief epilogue to its decision that the taxpayer 
could have directly offset the short term capital loss represented by the 
guaranty payment against the Part A capital gain. 29 This would have 
16 [d. at 353, 436 N.E.2d at 135. See I.R.C. § 166(d) and § 165(f), applicable to the 
adjusted gross income computation under I.R.C. § 62(4) and thus to the computation of Part 
B adjusted gross income under G.L. c. 62, § 2(d). See also supra note 8. 
17 386 Mass. at 353, 436 N.E.2d at 135. 
18 [d. at 352, 436 N.E.2d at 134. 
19 [d. at 353, 436 N.E.2d at 135. 
20/d. 
21 [d. See G.L. c. 62, § 2(d) and supra note 8. 
22 See I.R.C. § 166(d) (1976). 
23 See I.R.C. § 165(f) (1976). 
24 386 Mass. at 353, 436 N.E.2d at 135. See supra notes 8 and 16. 
25 386 Mass. at 353, 436 N.E.2d at 135. 
26 [d. 
27 [d. at 352-53, 436 N.E.2d at 135. 
28 [d. at 353, 436 N.E.2d at 135. 
29 [d. at 353 n.3, 436 N.E.2d at 135 n.3. See G.L. c. 62, § 2(c)(3) (permitting deduction 
allowed under I.R.C. § 1202 - 60% of "net capital gain" - from Part A income); I.R.C. § 
1222(11) (1976) (defining "net capital gain" as the excess of net long-term capital gain over 
net short-term capital loss). 
11
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yielded more favorable tax consequences to the taxpayer since Part A 
income is taxed at a higher rate than Part B income.3o The: Court noted, 
however, that this direct offset treatment would be inconsistent with the 
position already taken by the taxpayer on both his federal and state 
returns and, consequently, did not deem the taxpayer entitled to such 
treatment.H 
The Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Green clearly expressed the 
view that permissible loss deductions under section 62 of the Internal 
Revenue Code are deductible, without regard to source, from Part B 
income and, to the extent the loss deductions exceed such income, may 
additionally offset business-connected Part A capital gains. This presum-
ably could result in ordinary losses being used to offset capital gain 
income. It should be noted, however, that for tax years beginning after 
1979, the deductibility of non-business bad debts is no longer a disputable 
entitlement since the definition of capital gains and losses excluding such 
debts was repealed in 1979.32 
§ 16.4. Installment Sales Treatment - Subsequent Legislation. During 
the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the effect ofa 1971 
legislative tax enactment on a transaction consummated in a prior year, 
but reported on an installment method. In Johnson v. Department of 
Revenue l the taxpayer challenged on both statutory and constitutional 
grounds the determination of the Commissioner of Revenue (the "Com-
missioner") that a 1971 enactment, rendering taxable the gain derived 
from certain sales of realty, applied to the gain element of an installment 
payment received by the taxpayer in 1973.2 The installment payment was 
referable to a land sale transaction consummated in 1970.3 .The Supreme 
Judicial Court, in upholding the Commissioner's determination, effec-
tively placed all taxpayers on notice that an election to defer recognition 
of gain will not shield the taxpayer from changes in the tax laws unfavora-
bly affecting the treatment of previously realized, but unrecognized, 
gains. 
In Johnson, the taxpayer sold a parcel ofrealty in 1970, receiving cash 
for one-fourth of the purchase price and taking a promissory note for the 
remainder.4 The promissory note was payable in three· equal annual 
30 386 Mass. at 353 n.3, 436 N.E.2d at 135 n.3. See G.L. c. 62, § 4 and supra note 3. 
31 386 Mass. at 353 n.3, 436 N.E.2d at 135 n.3. 
32 Acts of 1979, c. 409, § 1, repealing G.L. c. 62, § 1(k) (defining "net capital gain"). 
§ 16.4. I 387 Mass. 59,438 N.E.2d 1059 (1982). 
2 Id. at 60-61, 438 N.E.2d at 1060. 
3 Id. at 60, 438 N.E.2d at 1060. 
4Id. 
12
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installments. s The taxpayer elected to report the gain on the installment 
method for federal income tax purposes.6 He did not report the gain as 
income on his 1970 state tax return since the gain from sales of realty was 
not taxable under the Massachusetts income tax law then in effect. 7 
Further, the taxpayer did not report gain from the sale as income on his 
state tax returns for subsequent years through 1973, the year in which the 
final installment payment was received. 8 
Several legislative amendments to the state tax laws adopted between 
1970 and 1973 prompted the controversy in Johnson. First, in 1971 the 
legislature substantially revised the methodology for determining individ-
ual income tax liability with one result being that gains from sales of realty 
were no longer exempt from state tax. 9 Second, as part of the same 1971 
enactment, the legislature provided that taxpayers electing installment 
treatment for federal tax purposes were entitled to corresponding install-
ment treatment on their state tax returns. lO Finally, in 1973 the legislature 
completely revised the treatment of installment sales for state tax pur-
poses providing that only "installment transactions" would be entitled to 
installment treatment for purposes of deferring tax on gain. ll An "in-
stallment transaction" was defined as one which: (1) is treated for federal 
income tax purposes under section 453(a) or (b) of the Internal Revenue 
Code; and, (2) but for the application of section 453(a) or (b), would 
result in an item of Massachusetts gross income for the taxable year of the 
transaction. l2 
In response to these modifications in the state tax laws, the Commis-
sioner assessed an additional tax against the taxpayer in Johnson in 1973, 
referable to the gain from the 1970 transaction for which final payment 
was received in 1973.13 The taxpayer paid the additional tax and subse-
quently applied for an abatement. l4 The Department of Revenue denied 
the application.15 Its decision was affirmed by the Appeltate Tax Board 
(the "Board").l6 The taxpayer appealed the Board's decision to the 
SId. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. See Acts of 1957, c. 677, amending G.L. c. 62, §§ 5, 6; Flower, State Taxation, 1957 
ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 27.3, at 186-87. 
8 387 Mass. at 60, 438 N.E.2d at 1060. 
9 See Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 5. Prior to the 1971 amendments to the state tax laws, only 
gains from sales of realty connected with the taxpayer's trade or business or entered into for 
profit were taxable under state law. See Flower, supra note 7,' at 187 & n.!. 
10 See Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 18, adding subsection (d) to G.L. c. 62, § 63. 
11 See Acts of 1973, c. 723, § 11 and G.L. c. 62, § 63(a). 
12 G.L. c. 62, § 63(a). 
13 387 Mass. at 60, 438 N.E.2d at 1060. 
14 Id. 
IS [d. 
16 [d. 
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Supreme Judicial Court on the basis of two arguments: first, that the 
installment payment received in 1973 was excluded from state income tax 
under the amended installment sales provision, chapter 62, section 63; 
and second, that the Commonwealth could not constitutionally tax the 
1973 receipt from the 1970 sale,17 
Undertaking a statutory analysis, the Court first determined that the 
gain received by the taxpayer in 1973 was income subject to state tax 
"under the literal wording of [chapter] 62, [sections] 2 and 3," unless 
exempted by a particular provision of the state tax statute. 18 The Court, 
agreeing with the Board, determined that the exemption under chapter 62, 
section 63 urged by the taxpayer was not applicable because the 1970 sale 
did not qualify as an "installment transaction." 19 The Court referred to 
the two statutory prerequisites for an "installment transaction" under 
section 63(a) and found that only one of these prerequisites was 
satisfied.20 Because the gain from the 1970 sale was not taxable in the year 
of the transaction under the state law then in effect, the Cdurt pointed out 
that it could not be said that' 'but for" the application of section 453 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, the transaction would result in an item of Massa-
chusetts gross income "for the taxable year of the transaction."21 Be-
cause one of the prerequisites to the definition of "installment transac-
tion" was not met by the 1970 sale, the Court held that the exemption 
under chapter 62, section 63 was not available. 22 
After reviewing the transaction within the current statutory framework 
under Massachusetts law, the Court then addressed the taxpayer's con-
stitutional arguments against the additional assessment. 23 The taxpayer 
11 Id. at 60-61, 438 N.E.2d at 1060. See infra note 22. 
18 387 Mass. at 61, 438 N.E.2d at 1060. 
19 Id. See Dogo~ v. State Tax Comm'n, 370 Mass. 699, 702 n.6, 351 N.E.2d 854, 856 n.6 
(1976). 
20 387 Mass. at 61, 438 N.E.2d at 1060-61. 
21 Id. at 61-62, 438 N.E.2d at 1061. See G.L. c. 62, § 63(a). 
22 387 Mass. at 62, 438 N.E.2d at 1061. The taxpayer made two additional statutory 
arguments before the Court which the Court refused to consider because they were neither 
raised in the proceedings before the Appellate Tax Board nor addressed in the Board's 
opinion. The first ofthese two arguments was that the 1973 amended version ofG.L. c. 62, § 
63 was not intended to apply to pre-1973 sales.ld. Presumably in an effort to have a portion 
of the 1973 payment treated as the basis for state tax purposes, the taxpayer urged that 
former G.L. c. 62, § 63(d), as inserted by Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 18, should be construed as 
remaining in effect. Adoption of this interpretation would result in the taxpayer's basis in 
each payment for federal tax purposes being the measure of his basis for state tax purposes. 
The second argument was likewise aimed at attaining a favorable basis adjustment for state 
tax purposes, in this case, under the revised basis rules of former O.L. c. 62, § 7, as 
appearing in Acts of 1973, c. 723, § 2. 387 Mass. at 62 & n.3, 438 N.E.2d at 1061 & n.3. 
23 Id. at 63, 438 N.E.2d at 1061. 
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contended that the new tax enactments were being applied retroactively 
to his transaction in violation of constitutional due process and in viola-
tion of article 44 of the state constitution, insofar as the new legislation 
taxed previously accrued capital. 24 In addition, the taxpayer urged that 
the tax laws as applied to him were discriminatory and in violation of 
equal protection because he had previously elected installment treatment 
for federal tax purposes as opposed to re<;ognizing all gain in the year of 
the transaction when such gain was not taxable. 2s 
The Court rejected the basic premise underlying the taxpayer's due 
process and article 44 arguments. The taxpayer advanced the view that 
because the gain from the 1970 transaction was fully realized in the year of 
the transaction, subsequent changes in the state tax laws could not be 
applied to the prior transaction requiring recognition of any part of such 
gain not subject to tax in the year of the transaction. 26 Noting that federal 
gross income provides the measure for calculating Massachusetts gross 
income,27 the Court found that the taxpayer's installment treatment elec-
tion for federal tax purposes had the consequence of making the receipt of 
each installment payment, rather than the transaction itself, the "taxable 
event.' '28 Because the assessment applied only to the payment received in 
1973, there was no retroactive application of the tax laws according to the 
Court. 29 Likewise, the Court deemed it irrelevant that the new enactment, 
taxing gains from realty sales, had the effect of taxing capital accruing 
prior to the adoption of the legislation.30 The Court reasoned: 
The fact that a part of the taxed gain, represented increase in value . . . 
before the present taxing act, is without significance. [The Legislature], 
having constitutional power to tax the gain, and having established a policy 
of taxing it, ... may choose the moment of its realization [and recognition] 
and the amount realized [and recognized], for the incidence and the mea-
surement of the tax. Its failure to impose a tax upon the increase in the value 
in the earlier years ... cannot preclude it from taxing the gain in the year 
when realized [and recognized].3l 
Accordingly, with respect to both the taxpayer's due process and article 
44 arguments, the Court concluded that the additional assessment was not 
constitutionally infirm since the 1973 payment had not been previously 
recognized for either state or federal tax purposes. 32 Moreover, the Legis-
24 [d. at 63, 66-67, 438 N.E.2d at 1061-62, 1063. 
25 [d. at 63, 65, 438 N.E.2d at 1061, 1063. 
26 [d. at 63, 438 N.E.2d at 1062. 
27 [d. at 64, 66, 438 N.E.2d at 1062-63. See G.L. c. 62, § 2(a). 
28 387 Mass. at 64, 438 N.E.2d at 1062. 
29 [d. 
30 [d. at 67-68, 438 N .E.2d at 1063-64. 
31 [d. at 67, 438 N.E.2d at 1063 (quoting McLaughlin v. Alliance Ins. Co., 286 U.S. 244, 
(1932». 
32 See id. at 64-65, 67-68, 438 N.E.2d at 1062, 1064. 
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lature had the authority to amend the laws to require recognition of gain 
applicable to any "taxable event," for either state or federal purposes, 
occurring after adoption of any such amendment. 33 
The Court likewise rejected the taxpayer's claim of an equal protection 
violation based on his view that he was, in effect, being penalized for 
having elected federal installment treatment.34 The Court noted that 
"[a]ny distinction in a tax statute that has a rational basis will survive a 
challenge under the equal protection clause. "35 The disparate treatment 
under state tax laws of the taxpayer and one who did not elect installment 
treatment for a transaction entered into in the same year was an incidental 
consequence, according to the Court, of the legislative choice to adopt 
federal gross income as a measure of Massachusetts gross income.36 
Because taxation of installment recipients is not "a specific goal" of the 
choice to use the federal gross income figure for state taix purposes, and 
because the adoption of this standard "seems justified in the interests of 
simplicity," the Court reasoned that the tax laws did not work a denial of 
equal protection.37 The Court added that the possibility of a change in the 
tax laws' 'was a risk the taxpayer took in deferring the recognition of [hisl 
gains."38 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Johnson thus adopted a literal approach 
to interpreting the new tax enactments and permitted the taxation of gains 
upon receipt, under these enactments, of previously realized and previ-
ously non-taxable income. Because the receipt of the gain was the "taxa-
ble event" triggering recognition for federal income tax purposes, the 
Court apparently concluded that this characterization was likewise con-
trolling for purposes of permitting the application of the new state tax laws 
to the gains from the prior transaction. 
§ 16.5. Tax Exempt Institutions - Constitutional Challenges. In Trustees 
of Smith College v. Board of Assessors of Whately,t decided during the 
Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court considered a challenge raised by 
local tax assessors to an educational institution's claim to an exemption 
from state real estate taxes. 2 The local assessors, while conceding that the 
educational institution in question was a "charitable organization" within 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 65, 438 N.E.2d at 1063. 
35 Id. (quoting Smith v. Commissioner of Revenue, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 677,679,417 
N.E.2d 967, 969). 
36 Id. at 66, 438 N.E.2d at 1063. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
§ 16.5. 1 385 Mass. 767, 434 N.E.2d 182 (1982). 
2 Id. at 767, 434 N.E.2d at 182-83. 
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the meaning of the statutory exemption provision,3 claimed that the 
exemption was unavailable because the policies of the institution, in their 
view, violated the equal rights amendment to the state constitution.4 The 
Court, in an opinion further clarifying the powers and duties of local 
assessors, held that the assessors were without authority to challenge the. 
exemption claim on the basis of the institution's policy of admitting only 
students of one sex to its degree programs.s 
The realty at issue in the Trustees of Smith College case consisted of 
two unimproved parcels of land which were part of a larger tract of land 
surrounding the school's astronomical observatory. 6 The realty was 
owned and retained in an unimproved state in order to protect against 
"development and consequent interference from lights."7 
In 1979 the local assessors assessed the land and sent tax bills to the 
college.8 Smith College paid the assessed taxes and timely filed its appli-
cation for abatement on the basis that the realty was exempt from taxation 
pursuant to chapter 59, section 5, clause third of the General Laws. 9 Upon 
denial of its application for abatement Smith College appealed to the 
Appellate Tax Board (the "Board").lo 
Before the Board, the assessors argued that the land in question was 
precluded from qualifying for the exemption allowed by section 5, clause 
third because: 1) the land in question surrounding the observatory was not 
occupied for the educational purposes of Smith College; and 2) even if the 
use of the land did so qualify, Smith College was not entitled to the 
exemption because it engaged in sex discrimination in violation of federal 
and state law. 1I Smith College, in response, argued that the land was 
occupied for educational purposes, that the policies of the school were not 
in violation of the law, because no state action was involved, and finally, 
that the assessors had no standing to raise the sex discrimination issue. 12 
3 See id. at 770, 434 N.E.2d at 184. The relevant statutory provision, G.L. c. 59, § 5, 
clause third, as amended by Acts of 1977, c. 992, § 2, provides a tax exemption for "real 
estate owned by or held in trust for a charitable organization and occupied by it or its officers 
for the purposes for which it is organized." The statute defines "charitable organization" as 
either: "(1) a literary, benevolent, charitable or scientific institution or temperance society 
incorporated in the commonwealth," or "(2) a trust for literary, benevolent, charitable, 
scientific or temperance purposes if it is established by a declaration of trust executed in the 
commonwealth.' , 
4 385 Mass. at 768, 434 N.E.2d at 183. 
sId. at 771, 434 N.E.2d at 184. 
6 Id. at 768, 434 N.E.2d at 183. 
7/d. 
81d. 
91d. 
101d. 
Illd. 
121d. 
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The Board concluded that the land was exempted from taxation under 
section 5, clause third without reaching the question of the assessors' 
standing. 13 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the only issue presented by 
• the assessors was whether the equal rights amendment to the Massachu-
setts Constitution precluded a private educational institution, admitting 
only students of one sex to its degree programs, from receiving a tax 
exemption under state law. 14 Smith College raised the additional issue 
before the Court of the assessors' standing to raise the discrimination 
issue. 1S 
Justice Liacos, writing for the Court, ruled that a "literal reading" of 
the exemption granting statute, defining charitable organizations, limited 
the potential for inquiries into an institution's charitable status in the 
course of abatement proceedings.16 The Board, the Court noted, had 
found that Smith College met the requirements of a charitable organiza-
tion under the statute.17 The Court observed that the assessors had not 
disputed this finding, which the Court itself found to b~ "clearly war-
ranted."18 The Court went on to state that the assessors and the Board 
were foreclosed from taking any further action regardins an exemption 
claim other than requiring certification from the appropriate state body 
regarding the organization in question. 19 Finding "no authority vested in 
the assessors, by the statutes defining their powers and duties, to raise a 
constitutional challenge of the kind they [sought] to assert by [their] 
appeal," the Court concluded that Smith College was entitled to the 
abatement requested and, thus, affirmed the Board's decision. 20 The 
Court noted that the Attorney General alone was imbued with the statu-
tory authority to challenge the grant of a tax exemption on the basis of 
violations of the constitution or state law.21 The Trustees of Smith College 
Il Id. 
14 Id. at 769, 434 N.E.2d at 183. The notice of appeal filed by the assessors set forth the 
additional issue of whether the Board's finding that the property was occupied by the 
taxpayer for the charitable purpose for which it is organized was in error. Because the 
assessors neither briefed nor argued t~s issue for the appeal, the Court refused to consider 
it. See id. at 768-69, 434 N.E.2d at 183. 
IS Id. at 769, 434 N.E.2d at 183. 
16 Id. at 770,434 N .E.2d at 184. See supra note 3 for the statutory definition of "charitable 
organization. " 
17 385 Mass. at 769, 434 N.E.2d at 184. 
18 Id. at 770, 434 N.E.2d at 184. 
19 Id. See DeCenzo v. Assessors of Frant:figham, 372 Mass. 523, 362 N.E.2d 913 (1977) 
(assessors found to have no discretion as to blind person exemption under G.L. c. 59, § 5 
clause thirty-seventh, or as to veterans' exemption under § 5, clause ~wenty-second). Cf 
Assessors of Saugus v. Baumann, 370 Mass. 36, 345 N .E.2d 360 (1976) (hardship exemption 
under G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause eighteenth solely within discretion of assessors). 
20 385 Mass. at 770-71, 434 N.E.2d at 184. 
21 Id. at 771, 434 N.E.2d at 184. 
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case thus clarifies the limited avenues open to local tax assessors in taking 
action to deny tax exempt status to statutorily qualified institutions. 
§ 16.6. Business Trusts - Consolidated Returns. During the Survey year 
in Marco Realty Trust v. Commissioner of Revenue I the Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled that the filing of consolidated state income tax returns by 
business trusts is unauthorized and warrants the assessment of additional 
taxes and interest based on the filing of separate returns. 2 The Court 
emphasized in its opinion that the adoption of federal gross income as the 
measure of Massachusetts gross income does not imply that the federal 
consolidated return rules likewise govern the availability of consolidated 
filing for state purposes. 3 
The taxpayer in Marco Realty Trust was a Massachusetts business trust 
with transferable shares. 4 The taxpayer owned all the shares in a similar 
business trust with which it filed consolidated returns for both federal and 
state income tax purposes in the years 1971, 1972, and 1973.5 The consoli-
dation of income and expenses from the two business trusts inured to the 
benefit of the taxpayer.6 The State Tax Commission (the "Commission"), 
for each of the years in question, determined that the filing of consolidated 
state income tax returns was unauthorized and thus assessed additional 
taxes and interest. 7 The taxpayer paid the additional tax and filed for an 
abatement which was denied by the Commission. 8 The Appellate Tax 
Board (the "Board") affirmed the Commission's decision on appeal. 9 The 
taxpayer subsequently appealed the Board's decision to the Supreme 
Judicial Court.IO 
The taxpayer's principal argument before the Court was premised on 
the treatment of business trusts with transferable shares as corporations 
for federal tax purposes. I I The taxpayer reasoned that because the Mas-
sachusetts definition of gross income incorporates the Internal Revenue 
Code definition of gross income,12 the federal treatment of business trusts 
as corporations 13 and the authorization of affiliated corporations to file 
§ 16.6. 1 385 Mass. 798, 434 N.E.2d 200 (1982). 
2 Id. at 798, 434 N.E.2d at 201. 
3 See id. at 799, 434 N.E.2d at 202. 
4 Id. at 798, 434 N.E.2d at 201. 
5Id. 
6/d. 
7Id. 
8Id. 
9Id. 
10Id. 
11 See id. at 799, 434 N.E.2d at 202; I.R.C. § 7701(a) (1976). 
12 See O.L. c. 62, § 2, as appearing in Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 5. 
13 See I.R.C. § 7701(a) (1976). 
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consolidated returns under federal tax law 14 should likewise be consid-
ered incorporated into Massachusetts tax law. IS 
In rejecting this argument, the Court stated that "[t]he [Internal Reve-
nue] Code definition of gross income speaks only to what is includable in 
gross income. It says nothing about how income is to be reported or 
whether several taxpayers may report their separate incomes and ex-
penses on one return."16 The Court, consequently, found that the adop-
tion of federal gross income for state tax purposes did not carry with it the 
authorization to file consolidated state tax returns; 17 rather, the Court 
deemed pertinent provisions of state tax law controlling on this issue. 18 
Turning to the state statutory provisions governing taxation, the Court 
ruled that for each of the three years at issue the completion and filing of 
tax returns in Massachusetts was governed by sections 22, 23, and 24 of 
chapter 62 of the General Laws. 19 Section 22, the Court noted, provided 
that every individual, partnership, association or trust, receiving a spec-
ified minimum of income subject to taxation, was requiI1ed to "make a 
return of such income."2o Only husbands and wives, according to the 
Court, were given express authority under section 22 to file joint re-
turns. 21 The Court concluded that "[t]he clear intent of the Legislature 
was that every taxpayer subject to taxation under chapter 62, except 
husbands and wives, was required to file a separate return. "22 In further 
support of its view that separate returns were mandated for each of the 
three years in the case before it, the Court noted that other definitional 
sections of chapter 62 had consistently indicated that business trusts were 
to be taxed as individuals rather than corporations.23 This statutory 
14 See I.R.C. § 1501 (1976). 
IS 385 Mass. at 799, 434 N.E.2d at 202. 
16Id. 
17/d. 
\8 Id. 
19 See G.L. c. 62, §§ 22, 23, 24, as appearing in Acts of 1916, c. 269, § 12. Acts of 1976, c. 
415, § 100 repealed sections 22, 23, and 24 of chapter 62. Reference should now be made to 
G.L. c. 62c, §§ 5, 6, 7 added by Acts of 1976, c. 415, § 22. 
20 385 Mass. at 799-800,434 N.E.2d at 202. See former G.L. c. 62, § 22 discussed supra at 
note 19. 
21 385 Mass. at 800,434 N.E.2d at 202. See former G.L. c. 62, § 22 discussed supra at note 
19. 
22 385 Mass. at 800, 434 N.E.2d at 202. 
23 See id. at 798-99, 434 N .E.2d at 201 (quoting G.L. c. 62, § 8(a), as appearing in Acts of 
1971, c. 555, § 15: "In determining the Code deductions allowable to such partnership, 
association or trust under this chapter [the beneficial interest in which is represented by 
transferable shares] it shall be considered an individual and not a corporation. "); id. at 800, 
434 N .E.2d at 202 (quoting G.L. c. 62, § 8(a), as appearing in Acts of 1973, c. 1973, § 2: "The 
Massachusetts adjusted gross income of [a] corporate trust shall be redetermined as if it 
were a resident natural person."). 
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treatment, in the Court's view, contravened the taxpayer's contention 
that it was entitled to be treated as a corporation with the corollary right of 
filing consolidated returns. 24 In conclusion, the Court characterized the 
taxpayer's further argument that it was entitled, as any individual prop-
rietor with several businesses, to consolidate the income and expenses of 
its "ventures" on a single return, as "specious. "2S The Court thus 
affirmed the decision of the Appellate Tax Board that the taxpayer's 
consolidated filings were unauthorized. 26 
It is clear, then, after Marcos Realty Trust that the adoption offederal 
gross income for purposes of computing Massachusetts gross income 
under section 2 of chapter 62 does not imply that the federal consolidated 
return rules govern the manner and filing of state returns. State tax returns 
are instead to be made and filed only as permitted under the relevant 
provisions of the state tax statute. Consequently, a business trust tax-
payer, filing consolidated returns for federal tax purposes with related 
business trusts, will be required to make mUltiple separate returns for 
each related entity under Massachusetts tax law. 
§ 16.7. Sales and Use Taxes - Exemption. During the Survey year in 
Commissioner of Revenue v. Fashion Affiliates, Inc. 1 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court interpreted both the scope of the exemption from use taxes 
contained in chapter 64H, section 6(s) ofthe General Laws2 as well as the 
jurisdictional implications of the prerequisites to filing for an abatement 
under section 38 of chapter 62C. 3 The Court held, in the first instance, that 
leased machinery used to make paper patterns ultimately used in the 
process of cutting fabric for dresses is exempt from use taxes. 4 As to the 
second issue, the Court held that the Appellate Tax Board lacks jurisdic-
tion to pass on abatement claims for periods where, irrespective of any 
use exemption dispute, taxes are owing and the petitioner has failed to file 
returns. s 
Fashion Affiliates, Inc. rented certain machinery used in its business of 
manufacturing clothing. 6 The rented machinery, through a computerized 
process, traced dress pattern measurements on a long sheet of paper 
24 385 Mass. at 801, 434 N.E.2d at 202. 
25 Id. at 801, 434 N.E.2d at 202-03. 
26 Id. at 801, 434 N.E.2d at 203. 
§ 16.7. I 387 Mass. 543, 441 N.E.2d 520 (1982). 
2 See Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 45. For the text of this provision as currently enacted see 
G.L. c. 641, § 7(b) (as amended through 1983). 
3 See Acts of 1976, c. 415, § 22. 
4 387 Mass. at 547, 441 N.E.2d at 523. 
5 Id. at 547-48, 441 N.E.2d at 523. 
6 Id. at 543, 441 N.E.2d at 521. 
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referred to as a "marker. "7 The paper printout produced by the machines 
was then used to guide the fabric cutting knife so as to achieve maximum 
use ofthe dress fabric. s In the course ofthis process, the paper "marker" 
would be destroyed. 9 The Commissioner of Revenue (the "Commis-
sioner") assessed use taxes on the rented machinery in the hands of 
Fashion Affiliates, the taxpayer. IO After paying the taxes, the taxpayer 
appealed the Commissioner's determination that it was not entitled to an 
exemption from the use taxes under chapter 64H, section 6(s) of the 
General Laws to the Appellate Tax Board (the "Board").ll The Board 
granted the taxpayer's abatement request. 12 It also rejected the Commis-
sioner's claim that it was without jurisdiction to pass on the taxpayer's 
abatement appeal since the taxpayer had failed to file timely sales and use 
tax returns with the state. 13 The Commissioner subsequently appealed the 
Board's decision to the Supreme Judicial Court,14 
The Court noted at the outset of its opinion that the question before it 
was one of interpreting the scope of the statutory exemption contained in 
section 6(s) of chapter 64H.IS Under section 6(s), machinery "used 
directly and exclusively ... in the actual manufacture, conversion or 
processing of tangible personal property to be sold" is exempt from sales 
and use taxes. 16 Machinery will be considered as satisfying the exemption 
test of section 6( s) if it is "used solely during a manufacturing, conversion 
or processing operation to effect a direct and immediate physical change 
upon tangible personal property to be sold" or "to guide or measure a 
direct and immediate physical change upon such property where such 
function is an integral and essential part of tuning, verifying or aligning the 
component parts of such property." 17 
The Commissioner argued before the Court that the taxpayer's rented 
machinery did not fall within the parameters of the statutory exemption 
since it was neither used directly and exclusively in the actual manufac-
ture of dresses nor did the machinery directly produce property to be 
sold. IS The Court rejected the Commissioner's position that the ma-
7 [d. at 545, 441 N.E.2d at 521. 
8 [d. 
9 [d. 
10 See id. at 543, 441 N.E.2d at 521. 
II [d. 
12 [d. 
13 [d. at 543-44, 441 N.E.2d at 521. The Court noted that the taxpayer did file returns for 
one three-month period, the third quarter of 1976. See id. at 544, 548, 441 N.E.2d at 521, 523. 
14 [d. at 543, 441 N.E.2d at 521. 
IS [d. at 544, 441 N.E.2d at 521. 
16 G.L. c. 64H, § 6(s), as appearing in Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 45. The text of this provision 
is reprinted in a footnote to the Court's opinion. 387 Mass. at 544 n.l, 441 N.E.2d at 521 n.1. 
17 G.L. c. 64H, § 6(s). See supra note 16. 
18 387 Mass. at 545, 441 N.E.2d at 521-22. 
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chinery had to directly produce a sales item in order to qualify for an 
exemption under section 6( s). 19 It considered the test under that section 
satisfied in this case by the fact that the machinery was used "to guide or 
measure a direct and immediate change upon . . . [tangible personal] 
property where such function is an integral and essential part of . . . 
verifying or aligning the component parts of such property.' '20 The statu-
tory definition, in the Court's view, did not require that the machinery's 
guidance or measurement be direct or immediate in the sense of physical 
contact. 21 
Although the Court upheld the Board's determination that the use tax 
exemption was applicable with respect to the taxpayer's machinery, it 
nevertheless vacated the decision and remanded the case on jurisdictional 
grounds. 22 As previously noted, the Commissioner argued that the Board 
could not entertain the taxpayer's appeal due to the taxpayer's failure to 
file returns.23 The Court embraced the Commissioner's position that the 
taxpayer, as a prerequisite to filing an application for abatement under 
chapter 62C, section 38 of the General Laws,24 had to timely file a sales 
and use tax return. 25 This limitation on the taxpayer's relief applied only 
in those years where sales and use taxes were owing in addition to those 
assessed against the exempt machinery. 26 The Court consequently re-
manded the case to the Board for consideration of whether there was any 
relevant period during which the taxpayer owed no sales and use taxes.27 
As to any such period the Court concluded that the Board should abate 
the tax. 28 The Court held, however, that for those periods during which 
the taxpayer was otherwise liable for a sales or use tax and where no 
return had been filed prior to the application for abatement, the Board was 
without jurisdiction to hear the taxpayer's abatement appeals. 29 
§ 16.8. Corporate Excise Tax - Gross Income. Throughout the Massa-
chusetts tax statutes there are found numerous references to the federal 
19 [d. at 546, 441 N.E.2d at 522. 
20 [d. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
21 387 Mass. at 545, 441 N.E.2d at 522. 
22 [d. at 548, 441 N.E.2d at 523. The Court upheld the Board's decision with respect to the 
three month period for which returns were filed by the taxpayer in 1976. [d. 
23 [d. at 543-44, 441 N.E.2d at 521. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
24 See Acts of 1976, c. 415, § 22. G.L. c. 62C, § 38 provides, in relevant part: "No tax 
assessed on any person liable to taxation shall be abated unless the person assessed shall 
have filed, at or before the time of bringing his application for abatement, a return." 
25 387 Mass. at 547, 441 N .E.2d at 523. 
26 [d. at 548, 441 N.E.2d at 523. 
27 [d. 
28 [d. 
29 [d. 
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Internal Revenue Code (the "Code").! An understanding ofthe interac-
tion of the Massachusetts tax statutes and the Code is the~efore essential 
for proper tax planning. In the case of Rohrbough, Inc. v. Commissioner 
of Revenue, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the implications of the 
statutory adoption of federal gross income for purposes of computing 
state tax liability where a particular transaction is reported differently on 
state and federal tax returns. 3 The Court emphasized that although the 
taxpayer's federal gross income return figure will normally be the same on 
his state tax returns, this is not always the case where differing elections 
are made with respect to tax treatment. 4 Rohrbough, Inc. specifically 
involves the consequences of electing different tax treatment on state and 
federal returns for an installment sales transaction. 
In 1971, George Rohrbough derived a capital gain from the sale of real 
estate.s Because the purchase price was to be paid over asix year period, 
he elected to report the gain as an installment sale for federal income tax 
purposes under section 453 of the Code.6 For Massachusetts income tax 
purposes, however, he reported the entire gain on his 1971 individual 
income tax return and paid the capital gains tax in full at that time. 7 
Subsequently, Rohrbough transferred the outstanding installment notes to 
a corporation, the taxpayer in this case, in exchange for 100 shares of 
stock. 8 The taxpayer corporation received all installment payments sub-
sequent to the transfer and included the taxable gain realized from the 
installment payments in gross income on its federal corporate income tax 
returns. 9 On its Massachusetts corporate excise tax returns, however, the 
taxpayer corporation excluded the capital gain reported on its federal 
returns from gross income. to The taxpayer reasoned that the entire tax on 
the gain from the installment notes had previously been paid by George 
Rohrbough, as reflected in his 1971 individual state income tax return. ll 
The Commissioner of Revenue (the "Commissioner") subsequently 
adjusted the taxpayer corporation's corporate excise returns to include in 
gross income the gain realized from the installment payments and as-
§ 16.8. 1 See, e.g., G.L. c. 62, § 2 (federal gross income adopted for purposes of 
computing individual tax liability); G.L. c. 63, §§ 30(5)(a) and 32 (federal gross income 
adopted for purposes of computing corporate excise tax). 
2 385 Mass. 830, 434 N.E.2d 211 (1982). 
3 Id. at 832, 434 N .E.2d at 212. 
4Id. 
SId. at 830, 434 N.E.2d at 211. 
6 Id. See I.R.C. § 453 (1976). 
7 385 Mass. at 830, 434 N.E.2d at 211. 
8 Id. at 830,434 N.E.2d at 211-12. George Rohrbough owned all the stock in the transferee 
corporation. The transfer was a tax free exchange under § 351 ofthe Internal Revenue Code. 
9 385 Mass. at 831, 434 N.E.2d at 212. 
10Id. 
II Id. 
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sessed additional excise taxes to the corporation. 12 The Commissioner 
then denied the taxpayer's request for an abatement of these additional 
taxes.13 On the taxpayer corporation's appeal to the Appellate Tax Board 
(the "Board"), the Board ruled that the taxpayer was entitled to the 
abatement requested. 14 The Commissioner subsequently appealed the 
Board's ruling to the Supreme Judicial Court which affirmed the Board's 
decision. IS 
Adopting the conclusions of the Board,16 the Court analyzed the trans-
action in the following manner. First, George Rohrbough's recognition of 
the entire gain from the installment sale on his 1971 state tax return had 
the effect of increasing his basis in the installment notes to their face value 
for state tax purposes. 17 Second, the transfer of the notes to the taxpayer 
corporation resulted in no gain or loss to either Mr. Rohrbough or the 
corporation, and the corporation succeeded to Mr. Rohrbough's tax basis 
in the notes. IS Finally, since the taxpayer corporation's basis in the notes 
equaled their fair market value, the actual receipt of payments on the 
notes did not constitute taxable gain to the taxpayer corporation. 19 The 
Court concluded that the amounts received should not then be included in 
gross income for purposes of computing the Massachusetts corporate 
excise tax. 20 
The Court acknowledged that federal gross income provides the basis 
for computing a corporation's domestic corporate excise under Massa-
chusetts' tax laws. 21 It pointed out, however, that gross income will not 
always be the same for federal and state tax purposes. 22 This was true, for 
example, in the case before the Court where the taxpayer made differing 
elections with respect to tax treatment of installment obligations. 23 The 
Court finally rejected the Commissioner's argument that the taxpayer 
corporation was not being subjected to income tax on the payments but to 
a corporate excise, in part based on the income from the paytnents.24 The 
12Id. 
13 Id. 
14Id. 
IS Id. 
16Id. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. at 831-32, 434 N.E.2d at 212. See I.R.C. § 351 (1976). 
19 See 385 Mass. at 831-32, 434 N.E.2d at 212. See I.R.C. § 1001 (1976). 
20 385 Mass. at 832, 434 N.E.2d at 212. 
21 Id. at 831, 434 N.E.2d at 212. O.L. c. 63, § 32 provides that the corporate excise is to be 
based on "net income" which is arrived at by taking certain deductions from "gross 
income." Under O.L. c. 63, § 30(5)(a) "gross income" is "gross income as defined under 
the provisions of the federal Internal Revenue Code." 
22 385 Mass. at 832, 434 N.E.2d at 212. See I.R.C. § 453 (1976); cf. O.L. c. 62, § 63. 
23 385 Mass. at 832, 434 N.E.2d at 212. 
24Id. 
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Court responded that, in "applying the definition of capital gains in the 
Internal Revenue Code, there is no gain" and, thus, no income to be 
included in gross income for state tax purposes. 2S The Court agreed with 
the Boar~'s conclusion that to hold otherwise would result in double 
taxation of the proceeds from the same transaction. 26 
§ 16.9. Bank Excise Tax - Constitutionality. State chartered savings 
banks, co-operative banks and state or federal savings and loan institu-
tions are subject to an annual excise based on both their to~al deposits and 
net operating income under chapter 63, section 11 of the General Laws. 1 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court considered a chal-
lenge instituted by several savings banks and co-operative banks to the 
constitutionality of section 11 as well as a challenge to the application of 
this provision by the Commissioner of Revenue (the "Commissioner"). 
In Andover Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Revenue,2 the Court, in a 
declaratory proceeding,3 rejected the arguments advanced by the banks 
25 Id. See I.R.C. § 1001 (1976). 
26 385 Mass. at 831, 434 N.E.2d at 212. 
§ 16.9. I See Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 44. G.L. c. 63, § 11 provides in pertinent part: 
Every savings bank . . . , every co-operative bank . . . and every state or federal 
savings and loan association located in the commonwealth shall pay to the commis-
sioner an annual excise equal to the following: (a) on or before the twenty-fifth day of 
the sevent\l month of the taxable year, there shall be paid (1) six hundred twenty-
seven one thousandths per cent of a reasonable estimate of its net operating income, 
as hereinafter defined, for the taxable year, and (2) one-sixteenth of one per cent of 
the average Rtnount of its deposits or of its savings accounts and share capital for the 
first six months of the taxable year, after deducting from such average Rtnounts (i) its 
real estate used for banking purposes, valued at cost less reasonable depreciation, 
and (ii) th~ unpaid balance on its loans secured by the mortgage of real estate taxable 
in this commonwealth, or real estate situated in a state contiguous to the common-
wealth, and within a radius of fifty miles of the main office of such bank or associa-
tion, and in the case of a bank or association not previously subject to tax by the 
commonwealth the unpaid balances on such of its loans secured by the mortgage of 
real estate located outside of the commonwealth which are outstanding on Mirrch 
first, nineteen hundred and sixty-six, both as of the close of such six month period; 
and (b) [The first paragraph of subsection (b) is similar to subsection (a), except that 
the tax is to be paid after the close of the taxable year, and, with respect to the 
income-based portion of the tax, a different percentage is payable.] 
For the purpose of this section, "net operating income" shall mean gross income 
from all sources, without exclusion, for the taxable year, less (i) opetating eXPenses, 
(ii) net losses upon assets sold, exchanged or charged off as uncollectible during the 
taxable year, and (iii) minimum additions during the taxable years to its guaranty 
fund or surplus required by law or the appropriate federal and state supervisory 
authorities . .. (emphasis added). 
2 387 Mass. 229, 439 N .E.2d 282 (1982). 
3 Id. at 232-33, 439 N.E.2d at 286. The Court noted that although ordinarily a plaintiff 
must exhaust his administrative remedies before he will be heard before the Supreme 
26
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and upheld section 11 as constitutional on its face and as applied by the 
Commissioner.4 The Court's opinion provides a noteworthy illustration of 
the difficulties encountered in trying to wage a constitutional attack 
through the judiciary system against a taxing statute. 
The alleged constitutional infirmities in the bank excise tax provision, 
both on its face and as applied, may be summarized in the following 
manner. First, the banks claimed that the portion of the excise based on 
net operating income was "unreasonable" as interpreted by the Commis-
sioner because the net income tax base did not fairly measure the present 
existing value of the banks' franchises. s Second, the banks asserted that 
the Commissioner was incorrect in interpreting the statute so as to forbid 
the banks to deduct, as an "operating expense" from the net income tax 
base, the amounts paid as interest to depositors. 6 The banks' third claim 
was based on the Commissioner's application of the deposits portion of 
the excise only to state-chartered mutual institutions and not to federal 
savings and loan associations. 7 This selective application, according to 
the banks, violated both the Massachusetts Constitution and the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.8 Finally, the banks asserted that a statutory deduction from the 
deposits tax base, eligible only to the extent of unpaid balances of loans 
secured by realty located within certain geographical limits, impermissi-
bly interfered with interstate commerce in violation of article I, section 8 
of the United States Constitution. 9 
The Court concluded that each of the above claims raised by the banks 
was without merit,t° Chief Justice Hennessey, writing for the Court, 
prefaced the Court's analysis of these claims with an acknowledgment of 
the presumption that tax legislation is valid and is not to be voided unless 
it is established "beyond a rational doubt" that the tax is unreasonable. 11 
Adhering to this standard, the Court proceeded to address each of the 
banks' separate allegations respecting chapter 63, section 11. With regard 
to the banks' attacks on the use of "net operating income," as construed 
Judicial Court, the fact that the plaintiff-banks did not appeal to the Appellate Tax Board in 
this case did not preclude a declaratory proceeding where the case involved "issues oflaw 
that affect every thrift institution chartered under the laws of the Commonwealth." Jd. 
4 Jd. at 232, 439 N.E.2d at 286. 
5 Jd. at 232-33, 439 N.E.2d at 286-87. The banks claimed that because the net income tax 
base was unreasonable, the excise violated article IV, Part II, c. 1, § 1 of the Massachusetts 
Constitution. 
6 387 Mass. at 232, 439 N.E.2d at 286. 
7 Jd. at 232, 239, 439 N.E.2d at 286, 290. 
8 Jd. at 232, 239-41, 439 N.E.2d 286, 290-91. 
9 Jd. at 232, 245, 439 N.E.2d at 286, 293. 
10 Jd. at 232, 439 N.E.2d at 286. 
II Jd. at 235, 439 N.E.2d at 287-88. See Eaton, Crane & Pike Co. v. Commonwealth, 237 
Mass. 523, 130 N.E. 99 (1921). 
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by the Commissioner, in computing the excise tax, the Court initially 
rejected the banks' assertion that net income is not a reasonable measure 
of the value of the banks' franchises. 12 The Court stated that the "value" 
of transacting business as a mutual banking institution is not to be mea-
sured by accumulated surplus, as urged by the banks, but rather by "the 
benefits that are enjoyed by the depositors and borrowers." 13 Because, in 
the Court's view, the bank excise tax was intended to measure the value 
of the bank's investment function based on the benefits realized by its 
depositors, the Court concluded that the income-based portion of the 
excise was at least as reasonable as the legally tested deposits tax, which 
measures the bank's investment function according to the total deposits 
available for investment. 14 The reasonableness of the income-based ex-
cise, according to the Court, thus dervied from the fact that the depositors 
ofa mutual banking institution are the "owners" ofthe institution. IS This 
view of the relationship between the mutual bank and its investors like-
wise led the C~urt to uphold the Commissioner's denial of any deductions 
from net income for interest paid to depositors. 16 Contrary to the banks' 
categorization of such payments as operating costs, the Court concluded 
that the interest payments were, for tax purposes, more analogous to 
nondeductible dividends paid to persons with an equity interestY In 
support of this view, the Court pointed out that the accumulated surplus 
of a mutual bank is held in reserve for the benefit of its depositors. 18 
Furthermore, the Court noted, if a savings bank is voluntarily dissolved, 
after all debts are paid the remaining proceeds are distributed to the 
bank's depositors. 19 The Court extended this approach to amounts paid to 
holders of fixed-rate certificates of deposit, stating that the "superficial 
similarities to a debtor-creditor relationship" did not alter the basic rela-
tionship between mutual banks and their depositors. 20 
The Court next considered the banks' allegations premised on the 
disparate treatment of state-chartered mutual banks and federal savings 
and loan associations by the Commissioner in assessing the deposits 
portion of the excise. 21 The Court first rejected the argument that the 
12 387 Mass. at 236, 439 N.E.2d at 288. See G.L. c. 63, § ll(a)(1) and (b)(l) (set forth in 
part supra at note 1). 
13 387 Mass. at 236, 439 N.E.2d at 288. 
14 [d. 
15 See id. at 235-36, 439 N.E.2d at 288. 
16 387 Mass. at 237-38, 439 N.E.2d at 289. 
17 [d. at 237, 439 N.E.2d at 289. 
18 [d. 
19 [d. 
20 [d. at 238, 439 N.E.2d at 289. 
21 [d. at 239, 439 N.E.2d at 290. See G.L. c. 63, § 1l(a)(2) and (b)(2) (set forth in part 
supra at note 1). 
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Commissioner's selective application of the deposits tax violated the 
legislative intent of equality of treatment and thus constituted an uncon-
stitutional usurpation of the legislative function. 22 In construing the legis-
lative intent in enacting section 11, the Court emphasized that the provi-
sion had been enacted in 196623 and subsequently reenacted in 197524 
following a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals2s holding that 
the application of the state deposits tax to federal savings and loan 
associations violated federallaw. 26 In the Court's view, the reenactment 
of section 11, in light of the judicial modification dictated by constitutional 
law, manifested a legislative intent to continue to apply the deposits tax to 
state-chartered mutual banks.27 In response to the additional contention 
that this selective application of the deposits tax violated the equal protec-
tion clause, the Court relied on the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps28 in concluding that the 
classification presented "rationally further[ed] a legitimate state inter-
est.' '29 The Supreme Judicial Court adopted the view expressed in Phelps 
that because federally-chartered banks may not be subjected to state 
taxes absent Congressional authorization,30 the separate classification of 
such banks for state tax purposes cannot be said to be arbitrary and 
wholly unreasonable.31 As a consequence of its view that the separate tax 
classification of federal and state banks was not unreasonable, the Su-
preme Judicial Court found no violation of the equal protection clause. 32 
Finally, the Court addressed the banks' claim that the provision in 
section 11, which granted a deduction from the deposits tax base only for 
unpaid loan balances secured by realty located within fifty miles of the 
Z2 387 Mass. at 240, 439 N.E.2d at 290. 
23 See Acts of 1966, c. 14, § 11. 
24 See Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 44. 
25 United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 481 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1973). 
26 387 Mass. at 240, 439 N.E.2d at 290-91. The First Circuit held in the State Tax Comm'n 
case that the application ofthe deposits tax under O.L. c. 63, § 11 (a)(2) and (b)(2) to federal 
savings and loan associations violated 12 U.S.C. § 1464(h) (1976). 481 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 
1973). 
27 387 Mass. at 240-41, 439 N.E.2d at 291. 
28 288 U.S. 181 (1933). 
29 387 Mass. at 242, 439 N.E.2d at 291-92. When economic regulation is challenged as 
violative of the equal protection clause, the traditional test is whether the classification 
presented "rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. 
Board of Registration in Embalming and Funeral Directing, 379 Mass. 368, 376, 398 N .E.2d 
471,477 (1979). 
30 See First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 340-43 (1968) 
(The supremacy clause of the Constitution prohibits state taxation of national banks absent 
Congressional authorization). 
31 387 Mass. at 242-43, 439 N.E.2d at 292. See Union Bank and Trust Co. v. Phelps, 288 
U.S. 181, 186-87 (1933). 
32 387 Mass. at 243-44, 439 N.E.2d at 292. 
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bank's home office, impermissibly interfered with the flow of interstate 
commerce.33 Specifically, the banks asserted that the fifty mile limit, 
conditioning the deduction under section 11, had· the effect of discourag-
ing mutual banks from investing in mortgage loans beyond the geographic 
limits of the deduction. 34 This effect, they claimed, violated the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitqtion. 35 In rejecting the banks' 
commerce clause argument, the Court emphasized that historically state 
banks have never had the right, unrestricted by state laws, to exercise 
their corporate powers beyond the borders of their home state. 36 Fur-
thermore, the Court noted that geographical restrictions on banking 
transactions are commonplace in many states and are manifestly viewed 
with approval under various federallaws.3' The Court analyzed the rele-
vant case law interpreting the commerce clause and concluded that pre-
cedent did not support the position that the commerce clause precluded 
states from placing geographical restrictions on the activities of state-
chartered banking institutions.38 The Court reasoned that such limitations 
did not block the flow of natural resources or products of trade from one 
state to another, nor did they generally interfere with the flow of money. 39 
In addition, the Court rejected the view that out-of-state borrowers would 
with any certainty be burdened by such restrictions. 40 The Court thus 
found no constitutional infirmity presented by what it deemed to be 
reasonable restrictions aimed at ensuring "that the citizens ofthe [bank's 
home] state will be the primary beneficiaries" of the grant of the privilege 
to transact business intrastate. 41 
33 [d. at 245, 439 N.E.2d at 293. See G.L. c. 63, § 1l(b)(2)(ii) (set forth supra at note 1). 
34 387 Mass. at 245, 439 N.E.2d at 293. 
35 [d. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
36 387 Mass. at 247, 439 N.E.2d at 294. 
37 [d. (citing H. BAILEY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING LAWS (1964». In support of its 
view that federal laws sanction with approval the imposition of geographical restrictions on 
state banking transactions, the Court cited The Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1461-1468 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) anq The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977,12 U.S.C. 
§§ 2901-2905 (Supp. IV 1980). 387 Mass. at 249-50, 439 N.E.2d at 295-96. 
38 387 Mass. at 247-48, 439 N.E.2d at 294. The Court derived a two-part test from the 
cases cited by the banks in support of its claim of a commerce clause violation. First, the 
Court derived from these cases the principle that the commerce clause prohibits a state from 
blocking the flow of natural resources or products of trade from one state to another in order 
to satisfy local needs. See, e.g., Hughs v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Philadelphia v. 
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Second, the Court proposed that other commerce clause 
cases stood for the position tbat a state may not impose a greater burden on out-of-state 
businesses to the direct advantage oflocal interests. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 
U.S. 72~ (1981); B08to/1 Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). 
39 387 Mass. at 248, 439 N.E.2d at 294-95. See supra note 38. 
40 387 Mass. at 248, 439 N .E.2d at 29. The Court noted that foreign banks would certainly 
not be burdened by the o~ration of the tax. [d. see supra note 38. 
41 387 Mass. at 249, 439 N.E.2d at 295. 
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The Court concluded its opinion with a bit of advice to the banks. 
Although sympathizing with the present fiscal difficulties experienced by 
the banks, the Court nevertheless fOl,lnd itself in no position to provide 
relief from taxing statutes which have "come to seem burdensome" in 
recent years.42 Expressing the view that the banks' current ills were at 
least in part due to the complex regulatory framework within which banks 
operate, the Court directed the banks to look to the Legislature for relief 
rather than the judiciary. 43 
42 Id. at 2.50, 439 N.E.2d at 296. 
43 Id. at 250-51, 439 N.E.2d at 296. 
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